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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
KEITH HOLBROOK and GENEVE 
K. HOLBROOK, 
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J. HENRY EHLERS and NELLIE 
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10777 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CAS.E 
This is an action to quiet title to real property in 
the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah. Respondents 
elaim title by adverse possession against the fee title 
holders and also against appellants, who hold the tax 
titk• to the property as tenants in common with respon-
dents. 
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DISPOSI'l1ION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was submitted to the court on an agreed 
statement of facts and judgment was entered quieting 
title to the property in respondents and against all de-
fendants, jncluding the appellants herein. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The fee title holders have not appealed from the 
lower court's decision. This appeal is taken only by the 
appellants, as holders of the tax title as tenants in com-
mon with respondents, seeking reversal of the court'8 
decision in favor of respondents on the grounds that the 
stipulated facts and the law do not support the court's 
decision. Appellants also seek to have the case remanded 
to the lower court for an accounting of the rents and 
profits and for partition of the land. 
STA'rEMENT OF FACTS (R. 21-23) 
On July 1, 1949, Salt Lake County sold to Rennold 
Pender, Margaret J. Eliason and J. Henry Ehlers, ap-
pellant herein, the tax title to the property involved in 
this action, and issued its tax deed conveying the prop-
erty to these three individuals as tenants in common. 
The property involved is located immediately north of 
and adjoining the dairy farm of respondents. 
At the time they received the tax deed, Rennold 
Pender and J. Henry Ehlers orally a.greed between them-
selves that Pender could use Ehler 's one-third interest 
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m tht> property, and as consideration therefor would 
pay the taxes on the property as they became due. The 
taxes on the property were paid each year thereafter 
by PendPr or by respondents. Ehlers from time to time 
and each year personally checked the tax records to make 
cPrtain that the taxes had been paid. 
On .J urn' 11, 1951, Pender conveyed his interest in 
thP property to respondents by quitclaim deed and on 
June 21, 1961, Margaret J. Eliason conveyed her inter-
e8t in the property to respondents, also by quitclaim 
deed. Appellants did not jojn in these deeds, nor have 
they conveyed their interest in the property at any other 
time. 
lnunediately upon receipt of the quitclaim deeds, 
respondents went into possession of the property, en-
closed it with a fence and made use of it as part of their 
dairy farm operation. For three or four years following 
June, ] 951, respondents plowed and planted the property 
and since that time have used the property for grazing. 
No buildings or o.ther improvements were ever construe-
ted on the property. All profits from crops and pastur-
age were received and retained by respondents. Ap-
pellant J. Henry Ehlers was aware of the use made of 
the property by respondents and of the fencing and 
pPrsonally went through the gates in the fence from time 
to time. The public at large has made no use of the 
property without the consent of respondents. 
Shortly after receiving the quitclaim deeds from 
Pender and Eliason, the respondents, through their agent, 
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W. Louis Gardner, contacted Ehlers and offered to pur-
chase his interest in the property. Ehlers replied t-0 
Gardner that they were not interested in selling. 
Appellant J. Henry Ehlers, prior to July 1949, had 
acquired tax title to other properties and was generally 
aware of the acts required to obtain title by adverse 
possession. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE ACTS OF RESPONDENTS WERE NOT SUFFI-
CIENT TO ESTABLISH TITLE BY ADVERSE POSSESSION 
AGAINST THEIR CO TEN ANTS. 
Pender, Eliason and Ehlers became cotenants of the 
property when they purchased the tax title in July 1949. 
The quitclaim deeds from Pender and Eliason to re-
spondents placed respondents in the position of their 
grantors and they, therefore, became cotenants with 
Ehlers. Respondents did not consider themselves as 
sole owners of the property and at all times recognized 
the interest of Ehlers. 1Their offer to purchase Ehlers' 
interest indicated their knowledge that he was their 
cotenant, holding an undivided one-third interest in the 
property. Morton v. Morton, 286 s.-w. 2d 702 ('Tex. Civ. 
App. 1955). 
Respondents claim that they gained title by adverse 
possession on the grounds that they were in sole p-0s-
session of the property, paid taxes thereon for the statu-
tory seven-year period and also that they fenced, plowed, 
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planted and grazed the property. rrhese acts may be 
sufficient to adverse the fee title holders but are de-
cidedly insufficient to adverse a cotenant. The relation-
ship between cotenants is isuch that the acts necessary 
to start the adverse possession statute running against 
one and in favor of another must almost amount to actual 
ouster. 
The nature of this fiduciary relationship between 
cotenants is indi,cated by the following quotation from 
4 THOMPSON, REAL PROPE,RTY § 1801, at 136 
(1961 repl) : 
One of the legal consequences that ensues from 
the existence of a cotenancy whether a joint ten-
ancy, a tenancy in common, or a tenancy by the 
entireties is the existence of a fiduciary relation-
ship of a certain nature between the cotenants .... 
Its major aspeds are (a) that neither cotenant 
can acquire nor hold an interest in the property 
that is adverse to the cotenan,cy''s interest without 
acquiring it for the benefit of all cotenants; (b) 
that no co.tenant can himself hold adversely to the 
other cotenants except under stated conditions; 
( c) that one cotenant so acquiring an outstanding 
adverse interest for the benefit of all is entitled 
to contribution from the other cotenants for their 
proporti'onate shares and for security therefor; 
and ( d) that neither cotenant can place a burden 
on nor derive a profit or advantage from the 
property without the consent of the others. Eia.ch 
has an implied obligation to sustain and protect 
the common title .... 
And, speaking more sp€cifically to what is required 
for one to obtain title by adverse possession against his 
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cotenant, the same authority states, in 4 THOMPSON, 
REAL PROPERTY ~ 1810, at 204-07 (1961 repl.): 
The entry and possession of one tenant in com-
mon are presumed not to be adverse to his cote-
nants. His occupation is pn"sumed to. be in ac-
cordance with his right as part owner to the 
possession of the whole undivided land. 
Until evidence of an actual ouster is shown 
the possession of one cotenant is the possession 
of all. This is true even where one cotenant con-
veys his interest to a stranger and the latter 
enters into possession. Adverse possession by one 
cotenant is possession of all .... 
A tenant in common in possession is pre-
smned to hold in the right of his cotenants, as 
well as himself, until notice is brought home to 
them of an intention to disseise them. In order 
to rebut this presumption and make such posses-
sion adverse it must he shown that the possession 
was with the intent to hold adversely and such 
intent must be indicated by acts calculated to 
exclude the cotenants .... 
Several cases have been decided by the Utah Su-
preme Court involving adverse possession as between 
cotenants. Most all o.f them cite the case of McCready v. 
Fredericksen, 41 Utah 388, 126 Pac. 316 (1912), as the 
one establishing the rule in Utah. The McCready case 
states the rule in Utah to be the same as that quoted 
therein from Elder v. McClaskey, 70 Fed. 529, 542 (6th 
Cir. ____ ): 
·where one enters avowedly as tenant in com-
mon with others, his possession is the possession 
of those others, so long as the tenancy in common 
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is not openly disavowed. Before adverse posses-
sion by one tenant in common against another can 
hegin, the onP in possession must, by acts of the 
most open and notorious character, clearly show 
to thP world, and to all having occasion to observe 
the condition and occupan1cy of the property, that 
his possession is intended to exclude, and does 
exelude, the rights of his cotenant. It is not neces-
sary for him to give actual notice of this ouster 
or disseising of his cotenant to him. He must, in 
the language of the authorities, 'bring it home' 
to his cotenant. But he may do this by conduct, 
the implication of which cannot escape the notice 
of the world about him, or of any one, though 
not a resident in the neighborhood, who has an 
interest in the property, and exercises that degree 
of attention in respect to what is his that the 
law presumes in every owner. 
Th<:' M cCrcady case considered whether the acts of 
fencing and planting a plot of ground, together with 
payment of taxes for the statutory period, were suffi-
eient to give title by adve.rse possession to one cotenant 
against another. The court stated at 41 Utah 39~97: 
... it must be remembered that the posses-
sion, and even the use, by one cotenant of prem-
ises is always presumed to be the possession of 
all. Moreover, that any act of his which is cal-
culated to protect the property against a lien, or 
salP, or otherwise, will also he presumed to be for 
the benefit of his cotenants; and this presumption 
prevails until the contrary is clearly made to ap-
1wa r .... we are clearly of the opinion that under 
thP great weight of authority the acts of [the 
cotenant in possession] ... were clearly insuffi-
cient to constitute an ouster of his ootenant .... 
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The earlier case of Smith u. North Canyon Water 
Co., 16 Utah 194, 52 Paic. 283 (1898), also indicated the 
difficulty one has in adversing his cotenant. In that 
case one of the defendants had used water rights and 
paid taxes and fees thereon for a number of years, yet 
the court held that he had not acquired title to the water 
shares by adverse possession, stating at page 200: 
The possession of one tenant in common is the 
possession of all his cotenants. There is no ele-
ment of hostility in such possession, and an ad-
verse holding will not operate as an ouster, and 
set the statute of limitations running, until the 
tenant out of possession has some notice of such 
adverse holding. Such possession cannot be con-
sidered adverse, unless there is an actual ouster 
or some equivalent act showing the intent or act 
of exclusion. 
Ano0ther case involving title to water stock states 
in even stronger terms the rn~cessity of an ouster and 
repudiation in order to establish title by adverse pos-
session. In that case, Rasmussen v. Sevier Valley Canal 
Co., 48 Utah 490, 494, 160 Pac. 444 (1916), water stock 
descended to the heirs of the owner as tenants in com-
mon but one son took possession of it and for fourteen 
years "had the exclusive use of the water, paid all the 
taxes and assessments on the stock, voted it at stock-
holders' meetings, and in so doing was recognized by 
the company as the owner. We do not think that is suf-
ficient to establish an outster (sic) and repudiation by 
one cotenant against other cotenants." 
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The more recent ease of Sperry v. Tolley, 114 Utah 
312, 199 P.2d 546 (1948), held that the acts of dividing, 
fencing, separately using without accounting for profits 
or expenses, improving the buildings on the land, and 
even the purchasing of a tax title in the name of one 
cotenant, were not sufficient to. constitute adverse pos-
session. The court considered all of this as consistent 
with possession as a tenant in common, and cited the 
McCrcady case as holding "that any act done by a cote-
nant for the protection of the common property, will be 
presumed to be for the benefit of all tenant·s and the 
presumption prevails until the contrary is clearly made 
to appear." See also Walker v. Walker, 17 Utah 2d 53, 
4-04 P.2d 253, 256 (1965); Webster v. Krwp, 6 Utah 2d 
273, 312 P.2d 557, 560 (1957). 
The most recent case decided by this court con-
cerning the question of adverse possession against a 
cotenant is Heiselt v. Heiselt, 10 Utah 2d 126, 349 P.2d 
175 (1960). That case held that the exclusive possession 
and payment of taxes for thirteen years plus the making 
of extensive improvements at a cost of over $4,000.00 
were not sufficient to constitute adverse possession . 
. . . the repairs and improvements were such as 
a person in possession would make for one's own 
convenience and satisfaction and would not neces-
sarilv show an intent to oust cotenants of their 
rights or rebut the presumption that they were 
made for the benefit of all the cotenants. 
The court once again cited the M cCready case to the 
effect that 
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.. in order for a tenant to adverne his cotenant 
}w must "bring it home" to his cotenant and br 
the most open and notorious aets show to th~ 
world that ''his possession is intended to exclude, 
and does exclude, the rights of his cotrnant." 
The foregoing cases have t>stahlished a rule in Utah 
that makes adverse possession against a cotenant ex-
tremely difficult short of actual ouster of the cotenant 
or exprt>ss rPpudiation of the cotenant's titlP. Only one 
case has been found in which advrrse possession against 
a cotenant has been successful. The decision in that 
case, llfotheu.·s r. Baker, 47 Ptah 532, 155 Pac. 427 (1916), 
was bast>d upon t>xtraordinary fac.ts. These facts were 
qlmted h~- the court from the lower court's findings as 
follows: 
. the plaintiff ... has been in the continuous. 
open, public, and adverse possession of the above 
described real estate and has paid all tht> taxef' 
and assessments levied against said property con-
tinuously since 1886 under claim of title; and that 
she has used and occupied said premises contin-
uouslv since 188'9 and made valuable improve-
ment~ thereon of the approximate value of $12,000, 
consisting of a five-room cottage of the value of 
$3,000, one eight-room cottage of the value of 
$5,000, one seven-room house of the value of 
$3,000: and that she has expended the sum of 
$1,000 in leveling the surface of said ground; that 
she built walks, planted shrubbery, constmcted 
outbuildings for the covenient use of the occu-
pants of said premises; and that during said per-
iod of tinw when she made all of said improve 
ments and exprnded said money and labor shr 
waR occupying, holding and using said premisrl' 
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openly, continuously, publicly and adversely 
against all persons whomsoever and against the 
claims of all the defendants herein .... 
Obviously, the extensive improvements made by the 
plaintiff in the Mat hews case were the reason for the 
Court's decision in favor of the plaintiff. Just as obvi-
ously, the facts of the case now before the court are not 
sufficient to constitute notice to appellants that respon-
dents were attempting to assert title against them by 
adverse possession. The only acts of respondents herein 
that might give any kind of notice to appeUants were 
the fencing, plowing, planting and grazing of the com-
mon land. These acts were held insufficient in the 
McCrr>a.dy, Sperry and Heiselt cases discussed supra. 
Moreover, the Sperry and Heiselt cases also involved 
the making of substan,tial improvements on the prop-
erty and nevertheless held that adverse possession had 
not been established. No improvements of any kind were 
ever made upon the property in the instant case and 
therefore adverse possession has not been established a 
fortiori. 
Respondents' possession of the property, payment 
of taxes thereon and all of their acts with respect to it 
were consistent with their right as tenants in common 
to possess and use the whole undivided property. The 
presumption that all of this was done for the benefit of 
their cotenants has not been overcome in this case. 
A tho.rough discussion of adverse possession as be-
tween cotenants appears in Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 5 (1962). 
The author of that lengthy annotation, after examining 
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the more than 1100 cases eitf~d therein, concludes at pages 
23-24 that a cotenant may gain title by adverse posses-
sion against his cotenant but to do so 
... he must show that at tlw timP in question he 
was personally, or by tenant or agent, in actual 
possession of the premises, or of the particular 
and sufficiently defined part of the premises to 
which h(' makes claim, that he intended an actual 
adverse possession operative as of that time, that 
he did in fact hold and claim the premises adverse-
ly, and, lastly, that his cotenant or cotenants had 
knowledge or notice of that fact. 
POINT II. 
THE AGREEMENT OF APPELLANT TO ALLOW HIS 
COTENANT TO POSSESS THE PROPERTY PRECLUDES 
THE ASSERTION OF TITLE BY ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
ThP discussion to this point has assumed that there 
was no agreement between the cotenants as to who would 
have possession of the property. In other words, if 
respondents had gone into exclusive possession of the 
property without permission of appellants and with the 
intent of obtaining title by adverse possession against 
appellants, their actions with respect to the property 
were not sufficient to put appellants on notice of their 
intent. Therefore, the fact that respondents went into 
possession of the property with appellants' express per-
mission and pursuant to an agreement allowing them to 
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do so, makes appellants' case against adverse possession 
an even stronger one. Moreover, it is appellants' con-
tention that the agreement precludes respondents' asser-
tion of title by adverse possession. From the very nature 
of the agreement respondents' possession was not ad-
verse. It was even more than permissive. It was actually 
a landlord-tenant re1'ationship whereunder, for a consid-
eration, exclusive possession was given to one cotenant 
by the other. Clearly, under these circumstances, there 
can be no· claim of adverse possession. 
That such a landlord-tenant relationship can be cre-
ated between cotenants is supported by 4 THOMPSON, 
REAL PROPERTY ~ 1801, at 140 (1961 repl.), stating 
that " ... the relationship of landlord and tenant may be 
created between cotenants involving the passing of ex-
clusive possession to one cotenant." The agreement be-
tween Pender and Ehlers 0reated such a relationship 
and adverse possession cannot run in favor of a tenant 
and against his landlord without notice of such adverse 
holding being brought home to the landlord. 3 AM. JUR. 
2d Adverse Possesion ~ 166 (1962). 
The fact that respondents had no knowledge of the 
agreement between Pender and Ehlers did not relieve 
them of the burden of that agreement. As grantees of 
Pender, they stepped into his shoes and obtained no 
greater rights to the property than he had. In support 
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of this 4 THOMPSON, REAL PROPER'TY ~ 1798, at 
127 ( l 961 repl.), states that "one tenant in common can-
not convey his interest in a portion of the property held 
in common to the prejudice of his cotenants, and the 
grantee of one of the cotenants steps into the shoes of 
his grantor, subject to all the rights of the other co-
tenants and their successors." 
It is significant that respondents in this ciase ob-
tained their interest in the property by quitclaim deeds, 
which convey only the "right, title, interest and estate 
of the grantor'' and canno,t be relied upon as convey-
ances of actual title to the property. lTT AH CODE ANN. 
~ 57-1-13 (1953). Cases have made a distinction between 
a conveyance by one cOttenant to a stranger by warranty 
deed and by quitclaim deed. If the stranger takes by 
warranty deed, he has color of title upon which to base 
his adverse holding. But if he takes by quitclaim deed, 
he does not. 4 THOMPSON, RE,AL PROPERTY~ 1812, 
at 26 (Supp. 1962) Moreover, respondents did not think 
that the quitclaim deeds gave them color of title as 
against appellants. They recognized appellants' interest 
in the property and, by their offer to purchase appel-
lants' intPrest after receiving the quitclaim deeds, indi-
ca tPd they wen• not at that time attempting to hokl 
adversPly to them. 
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Appellant made no attempt to interfere with respon-
dents' possession of the property quite obviously for 
two reasons. First, he was relying on the agreement 
he had made with Pender. Second, he was aware that 
the surest way to convert his, and respondents', tax title 
into fee title was to hold adversely to the fee title holders 
and to pay taxes on the property for the statutory 
period. Respondents were in possession for appellants 
as well as themselves since the possession of one cotenant 
is the possession of all. One purpose of the agreement 
between Pender and Ehlers was to start the adverse pos-
session statute running against the fee title holders. An-
other purpose was to make certain that one of the co-
tenan ts would pay the taxes each year. Ehlers checked 
the tax records each year to be sure that this part of 
the agreement had been fulfilled. Since he found that 
the taxes had been paid each year, he could only assume 
that Pender had told respondents of his agreement with 
Ehlers and that they were possessing the property pur-
suant to that agreement. Without some kind of notice 
to appellants that respondents claimed the property as 
their own, repudiating appellants' title, there can be no 
claim of adverse posses,sion. 
C'ONOLUSION 
Under the decided cases in this country and, more 
particularly, under the decided cases in the State of 
Utah, respondents have not brought home to appellants 
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that they were attempting to hold adversely to them. 
Fencing, plowing, planting and grazing are acts that 
have been held insufficient to put a cotenant on notice 
of an adverse holding. Instead they are entirely con-
sistent with holding as tenants in common. Moreover, 
the agreement of appellants to allo~w their cotenants to 
possess the property exclusively for payment of taxes 
precludes any assertion of an adverse holding. Rather 
the holding was permissive. This permissive holding con-
tinued due to the lack of any ex:press notice to appel-
lants or of acts by respondents that would unquestionably 
put appellants on notice. 1Therefore, the lower court's 
decision should be reversed and the case remanded for 
an aocounting and for partition. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BAJCKMAN, BAJCKMAN 
& CLARK 
By:.~9~!~ 
1111 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, lTtiah 
Attorneys for 
Defendants-Appellants 
